Compare original research on binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution and recovery. Seek Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1, AgentSpec, and CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1, plus directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization work. Distinguish original paper text, abstract-only reads and metadata previews; compare action/argument binding, runtime state changes, expiry/replay and audit evidence. State coverage gaps rather than infer novelty.
10/2/2026, 5:38:42 PM · llm:deepseek:deepseek-v4-flash + heuristic (fallback from llm:cloudflare:@cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast) (fallback from llm:mimo:mimo-v2.5) on 1 step
> ⚠ Low confidence — 4 sub-claims remain below the evidence threshold within budget. Treat this as provisional.
Coverage note up front: The requested sources are not all present. The supplied set contains (a) a practitioner blog on human-in-the-loop agent workflows , (b) an arXiv abstract page for CAVA arXiv:2607.13716v1 , and (c) a practitioner blog on when an agent should ask for approval . Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1 is not among the supplied sources at all, and AgentSpec is not among the supplied sources at all. I therefore cannot compare original paper text for those two works, and I state that as a gap rather than inferring anything from their titles.
Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1 (claimIndex 0): No source passage in the supplied set is from this paper, and no passage names it. There is no original text, abstract, or metadata preview to draw on. This research question is unanswered — no evidence item is emitted.
AgentSpec (claimIndex 1): Likewise absent. No supplied passage is from AgentSpec or mentions it. This research question is unanswered — no evidence item is emitted.
CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1 (claimIndex 2): What is available is an abstract-page read only, not original paper text. The abstract frames the governance problem as: "what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later?" . It describes CAVA as "a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects" , positioned below PCAA, where "PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs" . The abstract states the paper "formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates" . So on the specific axes: approval binding and audit evidence (receipt integrity, attestation) are claimed as formalized; action identity canonicalization is claimed. However, the abstract does not describe proposal/approval/delay/execution/recovery stages, expiry, or replay protection in any detail — those parts are not answered by the supplied abstract page. The full 35-page paper text is not available here, so I cannot verify implementation beyond the abstract's claims.
TOCTOU / stale-authorization and directly relevant work (claimIndex 3): The two practitioner blogs are the closest supplied material, though neither is labeled TOCTOU research. On action/argument binding, states the proposal "should be immutable in meaning after approval: if the target or parameters change, create a new approval ID," warning that "an executor can receive approval for one action and perform another under the same record" . Its pre-execution checklist requires that "tool_name, target_resource, and proposed_parameters exactly match the pending call" and that the authorization evidence "resolves to a protected decision bound to the same action_hash" . On runtime state changes, the same checklist requires that "the current external state still permits the action" . On expiry/replay, it requires "the proposal has not expired" and "no execution_id already exists" , and cites OWASP guidance recommending "binding approval to the exact action, expiry and replay protection, least privilege" . independently says the decision should be made "in the runtime, after tool validation and before the external effect," that "the decision tied to the exact payload," and "Do not let the model authorize its own call" . On delay/resumption, notes "approval must survive the interval between a proposal and its resumption without relying on process memory" . On audit evidence, calls for storing the proposal "under a stable ID" with a controlled-vocabulary status field including "expired, executed, failed, indeterminate" and a reconciliation outcome , and warns "An approval can exist in a database and still protect nothing" . Neither blog is peer-reviewed research, and neither is explicitly a TOCTOU paper, so the request for "directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization works" is only partially met — the supplied material addresses the mechanisms but not as named TOCTOU literature.
Comparison summary: Only CAVA is a research source here, and only at abstract level; it claims formalization of approval binding and receipt integrity but gives no stage-by-stage proposal/approval/delay/execution/recovery detail in the supplied text. The practitioner sources give concrete mechanism-level guidance (immutable proposal, action_hash binding, expiry, replay/execution_id checks, current-state re-check, durable resumption, reconciliation status) but are not research papers. No conflict between sources is evident on the points they both touch; they are consistent and complementary. The major gaps are the complete absence of Weng et al. and AgentSpec, and the abstract-only depth for CAVA.
Evidence ledger — supporting quotes
What does the original text of Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1 say about binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery?
0%No supporting evidence
What does the original text of AgentSpec say about binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery?
0%No supporting evidence
What does the original text of CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1 say about binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery?
30%“This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later?” [S2] CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems
“The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates.” [S2] CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems
What do directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization works say about action/argument binding, runtime state changes, expiry/replay, and audit evidence for human approval of stateful AI agent actions?
20%“The proposal should be immutable in meaning after approval: if the target or parameters change, create a new approval ID.” [S1] Human-in-the-Loop AI Agents: A Practical Workflow
“Confirm all of these conditions: status is approved the proposal has not expired the reviewer is allowed to approve this risk tier tool_name, target_resource, and proposed_parameters exactly match the pending call authorization_evidence_id” [S1] Human-in-the-Loop AI Agents: A Practical Workflow
“The block belongs in the runtime, after validation and before the tool, with the decision tied to the exact payload.” [S3] When should an AI agent ask for human approval?
“The mention belongs here because approval must survive the interval between a proposal and its resumption without relying on process memory.” [S3] When should an AI agent ask for human approval?
Research evidence matrix
Compare research claims with cited sources and inspect recorded excerpts. An empty cell means no inspectable excerpt was recorded; it does not establish whether a claim is true, false, or disputed. Coverage and agent confidence are not measured accuracy.
| Research claim | Inspection status | [S1] Human-in-the-Loop AI Agents: A Practical WorkflowPublication: lvtd.devPublished: Not recorded | [S2] CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI SystemsPublication: arxiv.orgPublished: Not recorded | [S3] When should an AI agent ask for human approval?Publication: samuelfaj.comPublished: Not recorded |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What does the original text of Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1 say about binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery? | No inspectable excerpt recorded | No excerpt recorded | No excerpt recorded | No excerpt recorded |
| What does the original text of AgentSpec say about binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery? | No inspectable excerpt recorded | No excerpt recorded | No excerpt recorded | No excerpt recorded |
| What does the original text of CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1 say about binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery? | Recorded excerpt | No excerpt recorded | Inspect 2 excerptsThis makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. | No excerpt recorded |
| What do directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization works say about action/argument binding, runtime state changes, expiry/replay, and audit evidence for human approval of stateful AI agent actions? | Recorded excerpt | Inspect 2 excerptsThe proposal should be immutable in meaning after approval: if the target or parameters change, create a new approval ID. Confirm all of these conditions: status is approved the proposal has not expired the reviewer is allowed to approve this risk tier tool_name, target_resource, and proposed_parameters exactly match the pending call authorization_evidence_id | No excerpt recorded | Inspect 2 excerptsThe block belongs in the runtime, after validation and before the tool, with the decision tied to the exact payload. The mention belongs here because approval must survive the interval between a proposal and its resumption without relying on process memory. |
Reference export
3 article references. Recorded titles, links and dates; observed scholarly records also include supplied authors, DOI and journal metadata with read limits. Review metadata before using in a paper. Import RIS into Zotero with File → Import.
Cited sources and references
- 1Human-in-the-Loop AI Agents: A Practical Workflowlvtd.devFree public reference · no creator payment · extracted html text45%
- 2CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systemsarxiv.orgFree public reference · no creator payment · extracted html text35%
- 3When should an AI agent ask for human approval?samuelfaj.comFree public reference · no creator payment · extracted html text20%
Decision log · 92 steps
Breaking down: "Compare original research on binding human approval to the exact action executed by stateful AI agents across proposal, approval, delay, execution and recovery. Seek Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1, AgentSpec, and CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1, plus directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization work. Distinguish original paper text, abstract-only reads and metadata previews; compare action/argument binding, runtime state changes, expiry/replay and audit evidence. State coverage gaps rather than infer novelty."
Identified 4 research target(s) to investigate; these are not established facts
Deep mode: up to 4 paid/cached/public reads plus one bounded gap-expansion pass when needed.
Scholarly discovery: 0 provider requests succeeded, 2 unavailable; 0 bibliographic previews. DOI lookup resolved 0/0 detected identifiers (up to two DOI lookups per run). Explicit versioned arXiv targets use a bounded exact lookup (up to two), rather than keyword search. Metadata is not paper evidence. arXiv is preprint material; peer review is unknown. Selected originals must be read; no creator payout.
Web search: 4/4 planned queries attempted, 4 succeeded, 24 public page previews, 0 unavailable queries; query text bounded at 500 characters. Snippets are discovery only. Public reads spend no USDC; model and service operating costs remain separate.
Discovered 21 verified creator source(s) and 29 free public reference(s)
Recalled 60 past runs on this subject — how these sources performed when they were available.
ERC-8004 reputation loaded — composite scores on this subject.
Claim-aware portfolio (exhaustive; bounded selection, not a claim of global optimality) selected 4/12 positive proposal(s): 4 free/cache selections + 0 paid fresh selections, predicting 4/4 claim(s) above the evidence floor with $0.000000/$0.025000 fetch USDC reserved.
Free-preview pre-check maps an actionable source to every sub-claim (4/4); paid reading may proceed within the budget.
Strong topical match on original, binding, human, approval, exact, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — selected for the claim-aware evidence portfolio (targets claims 1, 2, 3, 4; 0 fetch USDC, 1 attention slot).
Strong topical match on original, approval, action, arxiv, cava, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — selected for the claim-aware evidence portfolio (targets claims 1, 2, 3, 4; 0 fetch USDC, 1 attention slot).
Strong topical match on original, human, approval, stateful, agents, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — selected for the claim-aware evidence portfolio (targets claims 1, 2, 3, 4; 0 fetch USDC, 1 attention slot).
Strong topical match on original, human, approval, action, agents, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — selected for the claim-aware evidence portfolio (targets claims 1, 2, 3, 4; 0 fetch USDC, 1 attention slot).
Weak match (only research, agents); not worth 0 USDC. - free public feed reference; no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only agents, directly, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public feed reference; no purchase or creator reward.
Already cached and still relevant (matches research, human, agents, weng, paper); reuse for free instead of paying again. - free public feed reference; no purchase or creator reward. — the free-preview coverage check could not connect this source to any sub-claim, so no toll is authorized.
Weak match (only research, only); not worth 0 USDC. - free public feed reference; no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only across, paper); not worth 0 USDC. - free public feed reference; no purchase or creator reward.
Strong topical match on original, research, human, approval, exact, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Strong topical match on original, binding, stateful, agents, recovery, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Weak match (only original, agents, execution, arxiv, work); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Strong topical match on original, agents, execution, reads, state, addresses sub-claim 2 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Weak match (only original, research, human, agents); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, execution, directly, paper, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, human, approval, action, execution); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, human, approval, action, agents); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, human, approval, agents, state); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, action, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, agents, execution); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Strong topical match on original, human, approval, action, agents, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Strong topical match on original, human, approval, exact, action, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Strong topical match on original, binding, human, approval, execution, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Strong topical match on original, binding, approval, exact, action, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Weak match (only original, human, approval, action, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, agents, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only original, human, agents, say, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Strong topical match on original, research, human, approval, execution, addresses sub-claim 1 & 2 & 3 & 4; worth the 0 USDC toll. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward. — the claim-aware portfolio chose a stronger, less redundant set inside the 4-source attention and $0.025000 fetch-budget caps, so this proposal stays unspent.
Weak match (only original, human, reads, agent); not worth 0 USDC. - free public original-page READ selection (not a cache hit); no purchase or creator reward.
Weak match (only agents, coverage); not worth 0.003 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, agent); not worth 0.004 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.005 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.003 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only across); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, work); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, agent); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only agents); not worth 0.004 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, agent); not worth 0.003 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, agent); not worth 0.003 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.004 USDC.
Weak match (only approval); not worth 0.003 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, delay, plus, agent); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only plus, agent); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only rather); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (only agents, execution); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.003 USDC.
Weak match (no key terms); not worth 0.002 USDC.
Already cached and still relevant (matches original, research, agents, recovery, evidence); reuse for free instead of paying again. — free-preview expected value 0.09 is below the 0.12 spend floor, so no toll is authorized.
READ Human-in-the-Loop AI Agents: A Practical Workflow · Rowset Blog - selected original public page, 0 USDC; not a cache hit.
Read extracted public text from https://rowset.lvtd.dev/blog/human-in-the-loop-ai-agents - S1; quote matching establishes source grounding, not fact verification.
READ [2607.13716] CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems - selected original public page, 0 USDC; not a cache hit.
Read extracted public text from https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.13716 - S2; quote matching establishes source grounding, not fact verification.
READ Stateful vs. Stateless Agents: Why Stateful Architecture Is Essential for Agentic AI - selected original public page, 0 USDC; not a cache hit.
Public page unavailable (html-extraction-unavailable); no evidence admitted. Continuing research.
READ Human approval for AI agents: when should they pause? - selected original public page, 0 USDC; not a cache hit.
Read extracted public text from https://www.samuelfaj.com/en/blog/when-should-an-ai-agent-ask-for-human-approval/ - S3; quote matching establishes source grounding, not fact verification.
Sub-claim "What does the original text of Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v…": 0% covered — No source corresponding to Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1 was gathered. The only Weng-related skipped item is 'Lilian Weng - Thinking about High-Quality Human Data,' which is unrelated to agent approval binding. No original text, abstract, or metadata preview of 2606.02668v1 is present, so none of the requested stages (proposal, approval, delay, execution, recovery) can be assessed.
Sub-claim "What does the original text of AgentSpec say about binding h…": 10% covered — No original AgentSpec text was gathered. Skipped previews mention 'agent-spec' (ZhangHanDong/agent-spec, a BDD/spec verification tool) and Oracle's 'Open Agent Specification,' but these are metadata/previews only, not the requested original text, and neither preview addresses approval binding across the five stages. Topical context only.
Sub-claim "What does the original text of CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1 say a…": 40% covered by S2 — S2 is the CAVA arXiv abstract page (abstract-only read, not full paper text). It explicitly states CAVA formalizes canonical action identity, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and attestation, and frames the governance question 'what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution.' This directly answers action/argument binding and audit evidence at a high level. However, it does not detail the proposal, approval, delay, execution, and recovery stages, expiry/replay handling, or runtime state changes; and it is abstract-only, so the original full text is not covered.
Sub-claim "What do directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization work…": 60% covered by S1, S3 — S1 (lvtd.dev) directly addresses action/argument binding (tool_name, target_resource, proposed_parameters must exactly match the pending call; immutable proposal; new approval ID on change), expiry/replay (proposal not expired, no existing execution_id, replay protection), runtime state changes (current external state must still permit the action), and audit evidence (authorization_evidence_id bound to same action_hash, protected decision). S3 (samuelfaj.com) supports binding the decision to the exact payload, durable execution across the approval delay, and keeping authorization outside the agent. Neither is a dedicated TOCTOU or stale-authorization research work, and neither provides formal treatment of TOCTOU races or stale-authorization proofs, so coverage is partial.
Two sub-claims (Weng et al. 2606.02668v1 and AgentSpec original text) are essentially uncovered, but no affordable skipped source contains the requested original text: the Weng skipped item is an unrelated human-data essay, and the AgentSpec skipped items are metadata previews of different projects (a BDD tool and Oracle's spec), not the requested original paper text. CAVA is abstract-only (0.4) and TOCTOU/stale-authorization is partial (0.6); the remaining budget is only $0.025, and none of the cheap skipped items (stablecoin/x402/payment/gardening/retro-hardware items) address approval binding, TOCTOU, or stale authorization. Buying them would not fill the gaps, so no purchase is recommended.
Final check — "What does the original text of Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v…": 0% assessed
Final check — "What does the original text of AgentSpec say about binding h…": 0% assessed
Final check — "What does the original text of CAVA arXiv 2607.13716v1 say a…": 30% assessed by S2
Final check — "What do directly relevant TOCTOU or stale-authorization work…": 20% assessed by S1, S3
Final coverage assessment — The supplied evidence contains only one abstract-page read of CAVA (S2) and two general practitioner/security blog excerpts (S1, S3). No original paper text for Weng et al. arXiv 2606.02668v1 or AgentSpec is supplied at all, and no directly relevant TOCTOU/stale-authorization paper text is supplied. S1 and S3 give useful general guidance on exact-action binding, expiry/replay, state re-checking, and audit evidence, but they are not the requested original research papers and do not cover proposal/approval/delay/execution/recovery as a formal original-text comparison. S2 is abstract-only and explicitly states CAVA formalizes approval binding and receipt integrity, but it does not provide the original text details needed for the requested lifecycle comparison. Therefore most sub-claims remain unsupported or only topically contextualized. The assessment does not establish a complete supported answer for every requested part.
Synthesizing a grounded answer from 3 source(s)…
Relevance review returned; only checked excerpts can retain support, and review cannot raise it.
Verified public reference (no creator reward) — S2 supports claim 3 at 50%: “This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution…”
Verified public reference (no creator reward) — S2 supports claim 3 at 40%: “The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection…”
Verified public reference (no creator reward) — S1 supports claim 4 at 60%: “The proposal should be immutable in meaning after approval: if the target or parameters change, create a new approval ID.”
Verified public reference (no creator reward) — S1 supports claim 4 at 70%: “Confirm all of these conditions: status is approved the proposal has not expired the reviewer is allowed to approve this risk tier tool_name…”
Verified public reference (no creator reward) — S3 supports claim 4 at 50%: “The block belongs in the runtime, after validation and before the tool, with the decision tied to the exact payload.”
Verified public reference (no creator reward) — S3 supports claim 4 at 50%: “The mention belongs here because approval must survive the interval between a proposal and its resumption without relying on process memory.”
Drafted answer citing 3 source(s)
Confidence: Low — 4 sub-claims remain below the evidence threshold.
lvtd.dev contributed 45% - free public reference; reward share withheld
arxiv.org contributed 35% - free public reference; reward share withheld
samuelfaj.com contributed 20% - free public reference; reward share withheld
Done. Spent $0 across 0 confirmed/simulated payment(s) to creators.
Portable research receipt
Take the evidence trail with you
One deterministic JSON bundle binds the answer, visible decisions, exact article versions, claim evidence and a Circle-settlement snapshot under SHA-256. Retain the digest to detect later changes; the self-check is not a publisher or Keryx signature.
Carries this dispatch’s question as context — never its answer. The next dispatch is read from sources bought for it.